Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

State Of Utah v. Sylvester Scott : Brief of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Jay V. Barney; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Scott, No. 10876 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4256

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
10876

-vs.SYLVESTER SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from jury verdict of guilty in the
Second District Court in and for Weber County,
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, presiding
JIMI MITSUNAGA
Legal Defender Association
By:
JAY V. BARNEY
231East4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for AppeUafll
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

F ! LED
''

~ · · ,'>__ .
,'

\

r'- 1q6E
-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
~TATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE-------------------------········---·· 1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ----·--·-···----······················-···
1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --····-··-····-·································
2
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS ··----····----·····--······-·····················-········
2
ARGU.l\IENT ---·-··-···--······--··--··-·--········-······-·--······-······-·······-············
5
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING COPELAND GRIFFIN TO
TESTIFY AT TRIAL WITHOUT DETERMINING HIS
ABILITY TO COMPREHEND AN OATH AND TO
RECALL AND RECOLLECT FACTS. ---··················-········
5
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW OF ACCOMPLICE AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §77-31-18 (1953), IN THAT THE EVIDENCE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT SAID INSTRUCTION .. -······················--··---··-·-···············--·--················-··-············
15
CONCLUSION ··········--··-·----··-·-····················-·-··········-··-········--········
19
CASES CITED
State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P.2d 458 (1937) ............ _.17, 18
State v. Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 263 (1952) ................ 18

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
State v. Hall, 112 Utah 272, 186 P.2d 970 (1947) ___________________ 18
State v. Herring, 188 S.W. 169 (Miss. 1916) ____________________________ 6, 14
State v. Moorison, 259 P.2d 1105 (Wash. 1953) ________________________ 6, 7
State v. Pethoud, 332 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1958) ____________________ 6, 7, 14
State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937) ----·-----------·
Watkins v. Watkins, 245 P.2d 434 (Okla. 1952)________________

18
6

STATUTES CITED
Section 77-31-18 Utah Code Annotated (1953) .... 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
Section 78-24-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ·-······-······----··-·-6
Section 78-24-2 (1) Utah Code Annotated (1953) ··-----····-·-····-- 6

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No.
10876

SYLYESTER SCOTT,
Drfrndant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Sylvester Scott, appeals from a conviction of second degree burglary rendered in Second
Distrid Court, Weber County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On the 14th day of December, 1966 Sylvester Scott,
appellant, was found guilty of burglary in the second
degn--e in Second Judicial District Court; whereupon,
appellant, on the 19th day of December, 1966, appeared
for sentencing before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist,
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District Judge. Judge -Wahlquist dc·nied appellant vroLation and sentenced him to the Ftah State Prison for
thf> indeterminate tt>rm as provided hy law.

RELIEF SOUC H'l1 OX APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of second
degree burglary and a st>tting asidP of t111• sC'nt(•ncc• imposed and an ordl·r dismissing tlw conviction and 8Pntence. In the alternativ<' appl'llant 8<'<'lrn the granting
of a new trial.

The appellant, Sylv<·st(•r Scott, and one \Yi11imn
Coleman were charged with :c;('<'ond <lq.;1·(•(• burglary for
nnlawfnll~- Pnt('ring the 1' and l Fnrnitun· Store in
Ogden, Utah, with intent to comrnii: lare(·n~- th('n•in. Both
were fonnd guilty of tlw erirnP elmrgwl. (1'-:2::~. :2-tO)
From snch a verdict, SylvPster Scott 1H'OS('C\lt("S this
a p]wal.
According- to l\Ir.

Oar~-

Bmrn·ortlt, tl:f• }.fanag('J' of

the bnrglarizC'd stm·(·, tLrP(' t,·k•vision sd:,; and

01w

eoffr(•

tahlt· disapp(•an·d from tl1<• :-;ton• hd1;('(•n tlH• ('Y<·ning·
of April ] 8, 1%(i and tlw fol!m•:ing a!'b·rnoon. Somdi11w
clnring th<> morning of April

rn,

1~)(i(i, Syl\'<•stPr S('ott,

who had ]ipf•n to thP ston· SPV(']'al ti1w·s h!'f'ore (T-l<i)
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Pnkn,d the ::-;tore, with some other fellows, for the purpose of rn•gotiating a contract for a sectional couch.
~\!though Mr. Scott seemed intent on buying the couch
(T-34), welt contract, although signed (T-34), was never
eons nma ted. ( T-1 G)
-While :Mr. Scott "-as at the store, two men, who
cnkred with Scott, WPnt into the restroom located in
an office in the> store. (T-3G) At the end of the business
da.Y on April 18, 10GG, l\Ir. Bosworth locked the store,
obst>rving nothing to he missing. (T-71) However, the
follmYing afternoon ahont 3 :30 p.m. the previously mention('d items \\-ere discovered to be missing and not until
\Yednesda~-, April 20, the day after the mentioned items
turned np missing, did l\fr. Bos\\-orth discover that the
bathroom window scrPen had been removed, (T-58) and
that a footrnark had bet'n left on a crushed kleenex box,
sitting atop the toilet tank. (T-57) Mr. Bosworth did,
however, notice a mnd print on the toilet seat lid the day
hefore. cr-57) Such evidence regarding the footprints
was corroborated hy an Ogden police officer, James
\Yold. (T-134)
The only evidence connecting defendant with the
lmrgbry was that of one Copeland Griffin. Griffin, a
kc·~- witness for the State, had signed an affidavit, (Def Pmw exhibit 2 and repeated at T-212) implicating Scott

nncl Coleman as the participants in the crime and designating the location of the stolen items. On the basis of
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the jnformation received from Griffin, a search warrant
was obtained (T-137) and the police on May 4, 19GG
(T-138) went to the home of one Carol Jean Craig and
found a television and a eoffet> table. Cl1-188) Tlws(~ ikms
were later identified by Mr. Bosworth at the policP station as the itrms taken from his storP.
At trial, Griffin testified (contrary to his affidayit
us presented in ~\rp;nnwnt I, infrn) tlid utter rd\1sinp;
the defendants' l'P(llWst to haul sonw fornitnre, lt<' IYPnt
to the store in qm•stion and ohs<'rYed tlu• dd'r·rnlants
hauling fnrnitmP from the ston' to th(' ear. (T-(i9, 70)
rrhe defrndants tlten left and were SPC'l1 again h~- Griffin
down on 25th Stre<·t at PortNs' ar~d \\'aikrs' in Ogdt>n.
(T-121)
CounS('l for defrm;p JH'Ps0ntc•cl two "-it1wssl's, Carol
.] ean Craig and Anrn•ttc• llollS(', as irnp(·ne11i11g witness<·s
of Mr. Griffin. Mr. Griffin had ass(•rt<'d that lw had
nenr sold a t<•lPvis:on to any 1wrson (T-D:3, D~), hnt Miss
Craig and Mrs. Honse hoth frstifo·d that tliv>- had purehased a T\T from Ur. Co1wland Griffin. (S<><' rr-178 and
'11-195 resp<•etiv0ly) Each TY sd imrclias<•d l»- tlw two
defrns<' witnPSS('S was iclcntifit'd as one• l!k,•ly to haye
hc•(•n stolc•n.
Prior to Mr. Griffin's kstiJ\ing against tl1<' <h'frndants, conmH'l for each dPfrndunt d1all<·ngecl Urifl'i11's
eom1wtPney to

t<>stif~-.

(rl'-<i-1, (i5) By D<·f<·nsP Exhihit No.
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and argunwnt of comrnel it was pointed out that Copeland U riff in, following a charge against him for grand
lare('ny was found !€'gaily insane and committed to the
lltah State Hospital in November, 1962. Mr. Griffin
rn·nr stood trial on the charge of grand larceny, rather
he was released from the Utah State Hospital after his
condition had improved and pled guilty to the reduced
charge of pett)' larceny. (Defense Exhibit No. 1) At no
t imc• 1rns a dPtennination made as to Griffin's return to
sanity, and the sentencing court even asserted that Griffin could be returned to the State Hospital for further
tn•atnwnt at the hospial's request.
On tlw basis of Griffin's prior insanity history, defrnsP counsel objected to Griffin's testifying. Such object!on was based upon the fact that he was at one time
adjudged incompetent to stand trial and no termination
order of his insanity having at anytime been rendered,
Griffin was therefore, incompetent to testify. (T-64, 67)
The trial judge, after asking several questions of Griffin,
relating to present circumstances, found him competent
to testify; his sanit)' was to be a matter for jury considPration. (T-64, 67).
ARGt'"l\fENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
PERMITTING COPELAND GRIFFIN TO TESTIFY
AT TRIAL WITHOUT DETERMINING HIS ABILITY
TO COMPREHEND AN OATH AND TO RECALL
AND RECOLLECT FACTS.
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The fact that a person has heen adjudicated insane
will not, alone, disqualify him as a ·witness in a trial.
State v. Moori.so11, 259 P.2d 1105 ("\Yasl1. 195:3) ~ lYat-

bns

L

Watkins, 245 P. 2cl 4:1-± (Okin. 1952). FnrthPr,

it is generall.\- h1,ld to hP within il1<· discrPtion of tlw
trial judge to dt'tt>rrnin<' whdh<>r a penwn, who has
he0n adjudicat('d insane is corn1wtent to testi f"y. ,'Nate
v .•~loorison, supra; lVatki11s r. lVatki11s, s111;ro. IlowPver, if a iwrson lias hP<'n adjrnlicafrd insaiw, a prPsnrnption arises that he is total!:· in<·omJH't<•nt as a
witnc>ss. Stafl' 1'. Petlw11d. s:12 P. 2d Hl!l2 C\Yash. 1958)
Becanse Copeland Griffin's insanit_,. determination had
never heen revoked, it was neePssary that his eompdeney
to testify he adeqnately Pstahli:-d1<'d. Stl('h \\·as, hcrn-enr,
never don0.
Under Utah law "[a]ll iwrsons, without exe<>ption,
.. who, having organs of sens<', can iwrc·<'iY<', and perceiving, can make knm\-n tht>ir iwrei'ptions to otlwrs, may
lw witnesst:'s." Utah Code Ann. ~7S-:2±-l (rn:>:-3) llowrvrr, hy Utah Code Anotat0d 78-24-2 (l) (1!)58), "[t]hose
who are of nnsonnd mind at thP time of their production
for examination," cannot he witesses. Angnwnting tlH'
rules ahove cited, ·with r<'SJH'Ct to th<' ahility of a wihwss
of nnsonnd mind to kstif.\- is State L Ifrrrin[J, 188 S.\V.
Hi9 (.Miss. 191G), in which tlw C'ourt at 174 asserted:
(a) That a person of unsound mind is eomrwt(•nt as a witrn,ss, if (1) upon <·xamination ]tp
h(' fo1 nd to 11" of suffiei<•11t rn<·ntal (•apaC'it:· to
1
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understand tlw nature of an oath - that is, to
know it is hoth a moral and a legal wrong to
sw<'ar falsely, and that false swearing is a punishable aim<> in law, and (2) if he be possessed of
sufficient mind and memory to observe, recollect,
and narrate the things he saw or heard; (b) that
la"·fnl ronfirn·mPnt in an asylum for the insane,
or an adjudieation as an insane person, creates
a prima faeic· presumption of absolute incompdenc>- as a witness; hut ( e) such presumption
i:-; rehnttable by the voir dire examination of
tlw \Yitnl:'ss alone, or when aided by extrinsic
<·videne<•; and ( d) the burden of rebutting the
presumption of incompetency in case of confinement in an as>·lum or adjudication as an insane
person is on him who offers the witness; but ( e)
that absent such confinement, or adjudication as
an insane person, the bnrden of showing incompetenc>' on account of unsoundness of mind is on
him who objects on that ground.
fiurh rnlPs have also been recognized m State v.
Petlw11d, 332 P.2d 1092 ("Wash. 1958), and State v. Moorisun, 259 P .::!d 1105 ( 'Vash. 1953).
From tlw record it is clear that Mr. Griffin was
adjudicated insarn~ and that such insanity determination
was rn•nr tenninatlJd. (See Defense Exhibit No. 1)
Wlwrefore, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to
detnrn irw or upon tlw vrosecutor to show, not withstandrng tlw insanity finding:
that Griffin was capable of understanding the
natun• of an oath, that is, it is wrong to swear falsely
(1)
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and (2) that he possessed sufficient mind to ohset--V(',
recollect and narrate thjngs he saw and heard.
When Griffin was offer0d as a witiwss dd{'nSt' ohjected on the grounds of his adjudicatf'd insanity. 'J.'ht•
judge then examined Griffin as follO"ws at ( T-GG-G7) :
THE COURT: Cope, tell me \\·here yon are?
A. In OgdPn.
THE COURT: \Vhere ahonts in Ogden?
A. In the conrthonse.
THE COUHT: \Vhat arr \\"<• doing!
A. Having conrt.
THE COURT: \Vho is on trial?
A. Sylvester Scott.
THE COURT: \Vhat is

}i('

charged \vi th!

A. \Vho, him?
THE COURT: Mr. Scott.

A. Yes.
THE COURT: Yes.
A. Burglar)'.
THE COUHT: \\That day of this wPek is it,
do yon know?
A. Tuesday.
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THE COURT: Can you tell me about what
time of day it is 1
A. No, I can't.
THE COURT: Give me your best idea, what
time do you think it is 1

A. I would say about two-ten.
THE COURT: Can you see that clock in the
back, up there, on the back wall 1 It's a pretty
hard clock to see. Will you walk down there and
trll me what time it is1
A. Yes.

THE COURT: Can you see it from here or
do you want to walk down there1
A. Yes.

CWalking closer to the clock).

THE COURT: ·what time is it?
A. Two-thirty.
MR. NEWEY: Now then, for the Record,
would the Court take judicial notice of the fact
that the clock on wall doesn't show two-thirty.
THE COURT: Twenty-nine and a half.
MR. PHILLIPS: Would, Your Honor mqnire of the date and year1
THE COURT: What year is it?
A. Sixty-six.
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THE COURT: Do yon happen to know the

date?

A. No.

THE COURT: ·what month 1s it?
A. Decc>mber.

THE COURT: Do you know the day of the

month it

is~

A. No, I don't

It will be rPadily apparent that thP questions rPlate
to Griffin's prest>nt situation only. No qlwstions wer(•
asked Griffin which would reflect his ability to undPrstand an oath nor to rt>colll·ct aernrat('ly. ThP onl:-.· n-frrence bearing on Griffin's oath is at T-lGG >dH'rP tlw
following takes place:

THE COURT: Qualify him as to memory as
to yPst0rday's oath.

An examination of the r<'cord fails to diselose that
Griffin was (•wr asked whdh<>r hP understood tlw clnty
of an oath.
Although thP trial jndgP has it within his cliscrdion

to determine wlwthPr a iwrson a(ljudieated insan<' has
snffici<mt capacit~- to testify, the trial judge almsPd that
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discretion b.v failing to determine Griffin's capacity to
nnch•rstaJHl an oath and r0collec·t acrurately.
Tliat Griffin was incapable of either understanding
an oath or recollt'cting past events accurately or both,
is ohviom; from the nmuerons inconsistencies found in
his stat('lt!Pnt. Griffin s1,·ore an affidavit to the police
'' liich led to the charging of the defendants with the
crime• of second degree burglar)·. Griffin's affidavit,
,,·hi<'li was n0nr alte>red by Griffin (T-212) read as follows:
A. On about the 18th of April or the 19th,
19GG, Binky Colc•man and Sylvester Scott came to
t!tc• honw of my sister, Irene Turner' at about
30th and vVall. They asked me if I would haul
sonH' fnrnitnre from the store in South Ogden.
I asked Scott how he got in the store. Sylvester
told me that he had gone into the store before
thP store had closed and opened the window in
tlw restroom. I told the two that I would not
go with them, so they got another fellow to go with
them. I took my girlfriend and we went out and
parked it a little ways from the store and watched
Binkv and Svln•ster go into the store and come
ont ~,·ith a t~levision and table.
The table was a long table and the television
was a light colored one. I watched them for about
20 minutes. The~v took the things they had and
wC'nt to Sylyester's home. They took the things
into the h~s0mcmt of Sylvester's home. I saw this
stuff at Sylvestt•r's home the next day, Sylvester
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had one of the televisions and the table using it
upstairs . . . . (T-212) (A slight variance between
Defense exhibit No. 2 and the record at T-212
should be noted.)
At trial Griffin's testimony varied substantiall~· and
importantly from his affidavit, as below listed:

1. Irene Turned was no Griffin's sister (T-78)
but he asserted she was, both in his affidavit
as well as on direct examination. (T-68, 212)
2. Griffin stated he never asked the defendants
how they got into the store. (T-69)
3. He asserted he only saw two boys present at
the store. (T-89), hut his affidavit im·olved
three.
4. The gfrlfriend who was supposed to have
accompanied Griffin was identified as Daisy
Mae Bush (T-217); however, when she was
called, she denied having been with Griffin on
the evening of the alleged burglary. (T-222)
Also, an examination of Griffin's trial testimony seems to indicate he was alone at the
time he allegedly observed the burglary. (See
specifically T-95)
5. Griffin asserted that he newr saw the fellows
go in - only come out of the store. ( T-89, 113,
119)
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G. Clriffin stated that he did not know where
8,\'lvestPr 8cott was living in April or May
( T-7::q, .\Td he ·was adamant in his affidavit
that th<' ddendants went to Scott's home, and
placed the things in his hasement.

7. Furtlwr, at trial, Griffin claimed that when
thP dPfrndants left, he turned around to follow
them, bnt did not see them again for twentyfiw to thirty minutes. vVhen he again saw the
<kfendants, they were coming out of Porters'
and Waiters' on 25th and vVall street and the
car involvPd in the bnrglary was parked on
25th. ( '1'-121 ) A ft er seeing the defendants and
the car on 25th Street, Griffin went home. (T122) Consequentl,\r, Griffin never saw the deft>ndants ])lace the itt>ms in any basement.
It should abo he noted that Griffin never saw
the def Pndants around the suspect car, but conrlnded thr def<>ndants must have committed
thv hurglary because of the way the defendants
wore their hats, and also, because the car was
present. ( T-12::l) Griffin corrected his testimon.\' at T-131 and indicated he also recognized
thP de>fendants at the storP.

8. Griffin testifird that he saw the TV and coffee
tahlP at Carol Craigs home three or four days
(T-101 ), or sPveral days (T-71) after the burglarY. Whrrefore, Griffin did not see the items
at Scott's place the next day, as alleged in his
affidavit. To claim Griffin may have mistaken
tlw home of Carol Jean Craig for that of Sylvester Scotts', to attempt a reconciliation of
J1is affidavit with trial testimony, will not hold;
then Oriffin. at trial, indicated Scott may have
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hePn living on Childs, ( T-73) yPt Carol J Pan
Craig was id0ntified by him as Ji,·ing at 32nd
and \Vall AvPnne. (7-71)
An examination of tlw inconsist0ncies lwtwt>Pn Griffin's story as told on l\Iay 4, 19GG, about two \WPks afkr
the burglary, and his testimony at trial on DPcember 13,
19GG (T-1) evidences eitlit•r that Griffin was incapahlP
of observing and accuratPl~1 rPcollecting past en•nts or
that he did not understand tlw natnn• and importanc<'
of an oath to kstif\ trntlifully, or hoth. Certain]~· som<>
inconsistent statements on th<> part of a witnPss may be
excusable due to laps<' of tiuw, hut Oriffin's testimony
at trial was so substantially divt>rsP from hi::,; affidavit
that time alone would lw no <>xcn::,;(•.
·without qut>stion, Griffin, with or without his nwntal
condition, could not recoll(•ct tlw l'Wnts inYoh•ed and/or
did not know the meaning of an oath to tdl the trnth.
Because Griffin had hePn adjudicafrd immm>, without
heing rt>nderc·d sane at tlw time of trial, under law he
was presumed totally inr0111pentent as a witness, and tlw
burden was upon the Jll'O:-:(•ention to n•lmt sueh prP::,;mnption, or upon the judge to Pxamine Oriffin as to his
ability to know and undl'rstand an oath and to ohsPl'\'(',
recollect and narrate thP things he saw or }ward. Stat<'
1·. Herri11q, s11JJrrl at lRS; S!'(' State r. />et711nul, Sll/Jrll.
1'hP court's allowing <lrifi'in to t<':-:til'y following a
rneagPr examination of tlw witn<'ss, wliirh Pxamination

im oh·<·d 0111~· his fll'<'sPnt awaren<'ss, was Prror, and
;1n ali11,.:<· of' disC'r<'tion. Since Griffin had been adjudicat<'d i11san<· tl1<' trial conrt should have examined Griffin
to d<'tnmirn· his eapa<'ity to understand an oath and to
1 .. c<ill<Tt, not silllply hav<> asked questions relative to his
l ir<'sc•nt eapacit:-·.

ARGUMENT
Point II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW OF ACCOMPLICE AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §77-31-18 IN THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS
SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT SAID INSTRUCTION.

l·tnli Law relating to the testimony of an accomplice
1s l!nd<'r ~17-:n-18 Utah Cock Ann. (1953), as follows:
:\ conYidion shall not be had on the testirnnn>· of an accompliee, nnlPss he is corroborated
h_,. otli1•r <·vicknc1>, which in itself and without the
aid of the t<•stimon:-- of the aecomplice tends to
cmrn<·d the defrnclant "·ith the commission of the
ofl"rns<': and tlH• eorroboration shall not be suffiC'iPnt, if it lllPr<'l>· shmYs the commission of the
offrns1• or the eireumstances thereof.
Tl1<· <·,·id<·m·<· proclne<'d at trial by the defense, if
lH·li<·nd, rnnld have t>stablished that Griffin was an
H<·1·0111pli('<' in tlH• erilll<' all<'gedl>· committed by the dei'P11dants, mid his tPstirllon>· would thl'TI have necessitated
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corroboration to com'ict thP d0fendants. Utah CorlP Ann.
~77-31-18

(1953).

At trial Griffin assPrt<>d that althongh he rt>fuS('d
to help thP defendants hanl tlw fnrnitnrP from U & I
Furniture Store, (T-G9) ht> 1wvt>rtlwless, watclwd tlw
defendants remove the fnrnitnr<> from the store, and
threfore knew that a crime was heing co1111nittPd. ( T-G9,
70) Allegl'dly the crime occurr<>d in th« morning of tlw
19th of April. (T-17, 19, 71) Yd, aceording to th<> t<>stimony of Carole .foan (l\IoorP) Craig, Copeland (lrit'fin
appeared at her home and offrn•d to sPll her a t<>l<'vision
set, a coffe table and a earpet on April El, or ~O. (T-177,
l 78) The TY set was lat1•r id<'ntifi<>d as tliP OJl(' tak<-11
from the U & I Furniturt> ~ton• hPhn•<'n the 18th and
19th of April. (Cf. T-1:)8 \\·lwr<> .James \\'old disco\·PrPcl
the T\T at Carole J(•an Craig\; IJonH• afh>r sw<'aring
a warrant on Griffin's affidavit.) (T-11()-B8) Also l\[r.
Bosworth i(kntified that T\T at tlw station ( T-~O) and
matched the S(•rial number at trial. ( T-5:), G-1) Furthur,
according to Annl'tte Hons(', slw also bought a T\- from
Griffin ahont two months latPr, ( T-195) which TY abo
rPsemhl<>d, according to Bosworth, on<> takt>n from thtstorP. ( T-221)
A logiral conclnsion from the p\·idvne<> giv<>n is that
if Griffin did not actnall>· ean>· th<> fmnitim· 011t of tlw
store, he did in fact know that the furniture had ht><•n
stolen, and knowing sueh did tlwn·after I'<'C<'iV<' such
pro1wrty to sPll tlw smn<>, and sueh ff('(•ipt was irnmt>d-
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iait>ly aft<'r tlte commission of the crune. '\Vherefore,
1q1oll tlj(• <·\·id(·nc1· in·c'sl·ntd, it would not be unreasonable
10 c·o11<·lmk that (lrjffin in fact was an accomplice to the
hmglar;. in tl1at lH· was JH'<'S<'nt wlwn tlw crime was being
c·01mnith·d, was awan• of its commission, and aidrd and
alwttt-d i11 it C'ommission hy disposing of the fruits of
tlil· nirnP. His tPstimo11~·, lH'ing the only evidence which
eonrn·<·t(•d tlw defrndants to the hurglary, would not,
undn ·; 77-:11-1 S s11 pport a convietion of the defendant,
~('Ott .

. \ Utah Case, \rlti<·h might seem contrary to the posi1ion clairn<·cl h>· dPfrndant is that of State v. Bowman,
~;2 F tah :-i-±0, 70 P .2(1 458 ( U>:J7). However since the
( \·idPnc<· sliowl'd tlia (J riff in was in recent possession
ol' tlw stulrn goods with personal knowledge of the alleged
nirn1·, np1 wllant cont('nds that this case is distinguishable
frolll tlint or St11tl' /'. Br11/'IJ/(1JI, supra as Pxplained below.

Jn tlH· Bow111a11 casl', s1111rn, ddrndant appealed his
<·01widion of liurglar>·· 01w Hartman, aftPr pleading
gnil1y hi1w;elf, tt•stifiP<l against Bowman alleging they
Lotli '"·n1· inYohwl in tlw crimP. Following the burglary
tltP dl'i'<'rnlauts eontact<'d on ·werz, and asked him to
ston· sOlll(' l><n1·d mPrcliandise for them. '\Verz' testi111on>· \\as us1•<l to eonoborafr that of the accomplice
llartman. 1'la· qw•stion of wlietlir·r \Verz '\Yas an accom1ii i(·1· \\'hos(• frstirnony neP(ll•d eorohoration, was left to
th .it~l'_\'. On .~\pJH•al (kfrndant elainwd the trial court
·:l1nnld k1\·1· r11J<.d as a mattl•r of la\\· \\'Prz was an accom-
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plice. In rejecting the ddendant's position the court
specifically points ont that the tPstimony did not show
vV <:>rz in fact knew a C'rim0 had bern COlllllli tted when he
accepted the stolen property.
Appellant submits that Utah has adopted the position that an accessory after the fact i;.;; not an accomplice,
(State 1). Bowmau, supra at 54G, 70 P.2d at 4<il); ratlu-'r,
an accomplice, whosP kstimony rn'(•cls f'orrohoration
under W7-:)l-18 Ftah Code Ann. (1!J;J:1), is 01w ·who
is cnlpahly implicated in the c01111nission of th« C'l'illl\'
of which thP d(•l<'ndant is a<'C'llsPd, (State r. !Jowmr111,
supra at 548 70 P.2d at -Hil), or 01w who conld lH' C'har,ged
as a principal ·with Hw dt•frnclant on trial. State v. nucic,
1:21Utah184, 186, 240 P.2d 2(i3, :2G4 (1952). App(-'llant,
howPn·r, C'ontends that heC'anse thP Pvid\'nce shows Griffin >ms close]>- related to tlw erinw, tlw jnry shonlcl haw
lwen given the dnt>- to ddenni1w mH1<·r Jll'OJlPr im;trnctions wlwther Griffin was an acco111plict' or principal,
and if tlw affirmatin lw found, that a com·ietion could
he rendered only if his kstimony WPI'l~ indepeml<•ntly
co1Tohoratcd.
Appellant realizes that no instruction n•garding an
accomplice was ei tl1t•r 111adP or n'qnPstPd, and such foil11r0 rnav hP ad<'<1uat<> grounds to rPjt'ct tli(• pn·::ot>nt argunwnt. State v. Hall, 112 F. 272, JH() P.2d ~)70 (1!)-17).
Howev<'l', it is pro1wr for an amwllat<· court to eol'l'l'd
<nor~' at trial witlt l'PSp<·d to i11-.;tn1dions. Ci'. Stote r.
Waid, ~J2 Ftal1 2!.17, :~O!l, (;/ J>.~\l fiJ7, (i:l2 (l!J:37). Further,
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tlw casP ahow cit<'d of Stole 1:. Hall is distinguishable
1'10111 tlH• irn;tant casP on the basis that in the Hall case
tlw eonrt found snffi<'i<'nt eorroborating evid(~nce existed
to cm1'.·id tl11· d1·frrnlant. In the im;tant cas(~ before the
conrt, tl1(• only testimony offon•d hy the State, other
than tliat of Griffin's \\·as that offen~d by Mr. Bosworth,
th<' r & l rnmrngn alHl .Ta1ll<'S \Vold, the Ogden policeman.
~\n exarnination of the tPstimony of both men indicates
t1nly 1lmt a ('rime liad been committPd; only Griffin's
1• :-;tim011.\· implieates the dt>frndants. Corroboation which
1111•n•l>· shows that a erirne has hP1•n committed or the
l'ir('11111:-;hrnl'Ps t111·n·ol' is insufi'icient as corroborating
nid<•JH'I'. rtah CodP Ann. 77-31-18 (1953).
BPcause the freedom of defendant is involved in this
rn:-;1" tlw tl)l]H'Jlant as;;.;erts that it was the duty of the
trial conrt to instruct the jury with regard to the law
of aeeomplice and permit the jnr.\· to pass upon whether
tli<' sbtc>'s witnPss \\·as in fact an accomplice whose testi111on)· of w•cv:~sit)· lwd to lw corroborated. Such failure
con st itnfrd l'rror 1m·jrnlieial to the defendant.
CONCLUSION

For tliP n·asons ht>r!'tofore stated, appellant respectfo 11.\· :-.:ubrnits that tliP eonviction and sentence for burglary in tlH• s<•coml degTP<' renckred against him should be
1TY<·rs1·<l nml dismissPll. Altnnatively, appellant would
~uhmit

thnt a rn•w trial slionld be grankd.
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